Introduction
In the 1990s, presidents Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil both accomplished something of a macroeconomic miracle. Each managed to bring down his country's chronically high inflation rate to close to zero and to keep it very low for more than five years. This followed decades of price instability and repeated unsuccessful attempts to stabilize.
Some of the shine has come off both achievements since then. Brazil struggled through a currency crisis in 1998, which forced a sharp devaluation of the real and led to two years of stagnant output before a strong rebound in 2000. In Argentina, Menem's hapless successor, Fernando De la Rúa, struggled in vain for two years to generate growth and fend off a debt default, currency crisis, and run on the banks. He left office in late 2001, amid deadly street violence. As of early 2002, the peso was plummeting again.
So it is worth emphasizing, these crises notwithstanding, just how historically unusual the reemergence of stable money in Brazil and Argentina in the 1990s was. As of late 2001, Brazil's inflation rate had been under 20 percent for five years and Argentina's had for eight. In each country, this was the first time in 40 years that inflation had stayed this low for more than one year. There had been no equivalent eight-year spell of low inflation in Argentina since before 1944. Brazil had not had a five-year period with such stable prices since before 1937, when the IMF's statistics begin.
Argentina's new commitment to stable money was so entrenched by the late 1990s that it survived the severe, four-year recession that left 18 percent of the population unemployed at the turn of the decade. It took a major political crisis-and three presidents-to break the dollar peg. Even taking into account this recession, Argentine growth in the 1990s was higher than in any decade since the 1950s.
How did these political leaders succeed in macroeconomic stabilization where so many before them had failed? Political economists have developed a number of theories that might account for this. Some emphasize the role of crisis, the playing out of social "wars of attrition", or the electoral cycle. Others argue that Menem's left-wing credentials as head of the Peronist party gave him greater credibility when demanding sacrifice from the working class. I argue in this article that although these theories may contribute to an answer they do not add up to a convincing explanation.
In each case, success rested on a particularly effective political strategy that demobilized key beneficiaries of inflationary policies and gave investors confidence in the durability of the stabilization package.
While the specific tactics used in each case were dictated by the existing pattern of stakeholders-actors with an interest in inflationary policies and the economic or political leverage to impede reform-the strategie s were quite similar.
1 Both leaders split the labor movement, coopting parts in order to isolate and demobilize the rest. Both used similar tactics against business, coopting the strongest with tariff protection or privatization benefits. Both protected domestic banks in the short run, and bailed out their depositors when necessary, but weakened them relative to their foreign competitors in the longer run. Both provided provincial governors with short-run pork or cash in return for institutional changes-the closure or privatization of state banks and tax reform.
Parliamentary politicians were wooed with perks, pork, and policy concessions on individual bills.
Each assembled a motley legislative coalition of left-wing deputies elected on his coattails, freemarket ideologues, and clientelistic political bosses from the poorer regions.
The reform packages they designed, although often labeled "neoliberal," were far from orthodox. Both leaders compromised their commitment to liberalization and fiscal balance-and to some extent their reputations-in order to create rents and buy the support of previous opponents.
The markets proved happy to forgive such departures from orthodoxy in return for the political crediblity that they generated. Leaders that tried much harder to balance the budget (Collor, De la Rúa) ended up panicking investors, who saw that their commitments were not politically sustainable.
To be clear about the paper's goals, I do not pretend to develop a new theory or to test existing ones. I hope to show that theories developed to date are insufficient to explain these two important cases, and I set out to examine the puzzles they present. The goal is to illuminate the logic at play in the way that a chess critic might review and compare several famous games. I identify parallels and tactical combinations. But I do not here seek causal laws sufficiently general to be detached from context.
The next section describes the struggles of post-authoritarian governments in Brazil and
Argentina to reduce inflation in the 1980s and 1990s. Section 3 discusses five theories of the political economy of reform and argues that by themselves they cannot explain why Menem and Cardoso succeeded where previous presidents had failed. Section 4 identifies the stakeholders in inflationary policy in Brazil and Argentina, and explains why previous attempts at stabilization were undercut by their actions. It then describes the tactics used by Cardoso and Menem to neutralize and coopt a coalition of stakeholders that was sufficient in each case to bring inflation down for an extended period. Section 5 concludes by comparing the particular techniques and "cooptation currencies" used.
Inflation and Stabilization

Brazil
In the seven years before Cardoso was appointed finance minister in 1993, Brazil's leaders tried to stabilize the macroeconomy five times and adopted four new currencies. In 1985, when the military handed power to the elected president, Tancredo Neves, inflation was more than 200 percent a year.
The Cruzado Plan (1986-7), Bresser Plan (June 1987), Summer Plan (January 1989), Collor I Plan (March 1990) , and Collor II Plan (1991) followed each other in quick succession (Cardoso 2000) .
None of these drove inflation below 100 percent a year ( Figure 1) . A series of presidents-Sarney, Collor, Franco-saw their political credibility sapped by their macroeconomic failures (and, in Collor's case, by charges of corruption). When finally the Plano Real introduced by Cardoso in late 1993 reduced inflation to a manageable level, this won him the presidency in the 1994 election.
Much is still debatable about Brazil's inflation, but a few facts seem relatively clear. From early on, governments resorted to issuing highly liquid government bonds to finance their deficits.
Total federal debt grew from 23.5 percent of GDP in 1984 to 107.9 percent in 1989 (Coes 1995, p.91) . The growth of government securities increased M2, changes of which closely foreshadowed subsequent inflation during the decade from 1985 to 1995 (see Figure 1) . 2 As the increase in liquid assets drove up inflation, nominal interest rates on government bonds soared, forcing governments to issue ever more of them to roll over the debt (Filho 1998) . At the same time, many wages and prices had been indexed, givin g inflation a strong inertial component (Bresser Pereira 1993) .
Under the Real Plan, inflation fell from more than 2,000 percent in 1994 to 66 percent in 1995 and 16 percent in 1996-a level which has not been topped since then. The conventional wisdom has it that stabilization attempts almost always fail unless the government manages to bring down its deficit to a low level. 3 This was not the case under the Real Plan. In fact, the operational public sector borrowing requirement (that is, the PSBR correcte d for the effect of inflation on the state debt) averaged 4.25 percent of GDP in 1995-2000, compared to 0.3 percent of GDP in 1990-94.
The most dramatic fiscal adjustment came under the failed Collor Plans, 1990-91, when the budget even managed a surplus. Nor was the stabilization period one of strict adherence to monetary growth targets, many of which were missed and "quietly abandoned later" (Filho 1998, p.6) . In 1996-2000, M2 grew more than seven times as fast as prices. 4 Since GDP grew rapidly during this period, this resulted in a gradual increase in the ratio of M2 to GDP, from a depressed 17 percent in 1995 to 37 percent in 2000, comparable to that in other developing countries with moderate inflation.
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Argentina
Argentina's experience with inflation since the return to civilian rule in 1983 looks rather similar to that of Brazil. In 1983, the military handed over an economy with inflation at 337 percent.
For the next seven years, Presidents Alfonsín and then Menem tried repeatedly to reduce the rate to double digits. The Austral, Primavera, and BB plans-along with a number of less notable attemptsall achieved temporary drops, but prices quickly rebounded. Only in 1991, with the Convertibility Plan introduced by finance minister Domingo Cavallo, was a more lasting fall in inflation accomplished (see Figure 3 ).
Unlike in Brazil, the failures and ultimate success in controlling inflation follow closely the failures and success in fiscal adjustment (Dillinger and Webb 1998, p.14; Murphy and Sturzenegger, p.352) . The first civilian government inherited a nonfinancial public sector deficit of close to 10 percent of GDP (World Bank 1996b). Attempts to coordinate on lower price expectations by removing indexation and establishing nominal anchors were relatively successful at deflating inertial inflation. Price increases did slow temporarily after the Austral, Primavera and BB plans. However, until the government succeeded in dramatically reducing the public sector deficit, such successes never lasted more than a few months. Figure 4 shows the sum of the consolidated central government deficit and the quasi-fiscal deficit of the Central Bank. The sum of these deficits ranged from 2.9 to 8.6 percent of GDP between 1982 and 1989; only in 1990 Some have argued that a necessary condition for stabilization is a widespread sense of crisis, which motivates social actors to accept the temporary costs of adjustment. Soaring inflation may reach a "critical level where ever-rising, collectively shared costs and zero long-run benefits force interest groups to coalesce and to demand the implementation of monetary restraint" (Havrilesky 1990 ). In a number of past cases, according to Drazen and Grilli (1993) , "the heavy costs of extremely high inflation and the situation of emergency associated with it were necessary to force the adoption of stabilization programs." According to this view, success in Argentina and Brazil should have come when inflation reached some critical threshold.
A second approach links the timing of stabilization programs to the electoral calendar. If-as usually assumed-stabilizations have short-run costs but long-run benefits, governments should be more likely to initiate them early in their electoral term, and less likely to do so as elections approach (Haggard and Webb 1993; Remmer 1993) . If, on the other hand, stabilization attempts are successful in the short run (because they coordinate lower price expectations) but break down in the medium run, one might expect stabilization attempts shortly before scheduled elections.
Third, an influential article by Alesina and Drazen (1991) argued that stabilizations are delayed because social groups engage in a game of chicken, trying to avoid bearing the temporary costs. Reform occurs when the group that is more sensitive to the rising costs of waiting chooses to concede. "In the war of attrition, passage of time and the accumulation of costs lead one group to give in and make a previously rejected program economically and politically feasible." In this view, stabilizations should follow the political capitulation of one group that previously opposed the government's proposals. Labán and Sturzenegger (1994) argue that the capitulating group is most 5 Some attention has focused since stabilization on provincial budget deficits. However, these appear not to have exceeded 1.6 percent of GDP up until at least 2000 (IMF 2001, p.29). likely to be the poor, who have restricted access to the financial sector and therefore a lower ability to protect themselves from the costs of high inflation by keeping their assets offshore.
Fourth, Menem-and perhaps also Cardoso-may have benefited from his left-wing political credentials. As Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) How well do these five arguments account for the pattern of failure and success in Argentine and Brazilian macroeconomic outcomes? Elements of some arguments do fit the facts and probably contribute to an explanation. However, they do not by themselves amount to a convincing account, and those arguments that seem partially persuasive raise additional puzzles.
To begin with the crisis theory, it may be true that extremely high levels of inflation increase the odds that governments will try to stabilize. That does not explain why some attempts succeed while others fail. A perception that inflation was getting out of control prompted each of the 11 major stabilization attempts in Argentina and Brazil: only two lasted for more than a few months. Similarly, the electoral cycle theory suggests only why central policymakers might try to stabilize at particular times. It also cannot explain why some attempts succeed while others fail. There is, in any case, at best only weak evidence that stabilization attempts in either country were linked systematically to the electoral calendar. In Brazil in the 1980s-90s, stabilization attempts were introduced in the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth years of the five-year presidential term (see Figure 5 ). In Argentina, attempts were made in the first, third (twice), fifth, and sixth years of the sixyear presidential term. Considering legislative elections, in Argentina four of the five stabilization attempts occurred in election years (which alternate with non-election years). This might suggest that incumbents try to bring down inflation temporarily before voters mark their congressional ballots, but it is hardly definitive. In Brazil, congressional elections are held every four years. Stabilization attempts occurred (twice each) in the first, second, and fourth years of the cycle.
6
Did successful stabilizations in Argentina and Brazil follow capitulation by one previouslyopposed social group? The explanation I offer does focus on the competing interests of economic groups. The opposition of some of these did weaken at key points, facilitating implementation of reforms. However, these changes were not simple capitulation in the face of rising costs. Rather, specific government policies helped to change the interests of some previous reform opponents, 6 Remmer (1993) studied whether inflation tended to be higher at particular points of the electoral cycle in Latin American countries in the years 1980-91. She found that in Brazil inflation was significantly higher both right before and right after presidential elections, contradicting both versions of the political business cycle logic (which imply stabilization attempts either right before or right after). In Argentina, inflation was greater during and after a presidential election, but was not significantly lower before. As for congressional elections, Remmer did not find significant pre-election falls in inflation, but she did find that the exchange rate depreciated significantly less in the pre-electoral quarter in Argentina and during the electoral quarter in Brazil. Since Remmer's period (1980-91) included only one successful stabilization in Argentina and none in Brazil, it cannot offer much insight into what distinguishes successful from unsuccessful attempts.
compensating them for temporary costs or giving them new ways to benefit from stable prices. Other opponents were not persuaded to concede by rising inflation: they were isolated and weakened by deliberate government action. These were not cases of self-interested concession as inflation reached very high levels-if so, the same groups should have given up in earlier years when inflation rose even higher. They were cases of political manipulation by intelligent and sometimes ruthless incumbents.
[ Figure 5 Here] (McGuire 1996, p.145) . The number of workers on strike increased from 1.7 million in the third quarter of 1989, when Menem took office, to 4.2 million a year later (see Table 1 ).
It was only in the fourth quarter of 1990 that a sustained drop in strike activity began. This suggests that the fall in strikes did not have much to do with the trust Menem inspired among workers-more than four million out of a total workforce of about 11 million were not willing to give his stabilization plans the benefit of the doubt. The decline in strike activity from late 1990-before the Cavallo plan succeeded in bringing down inflation-probably reflects not trust but intimidation. It occurred right after Menem's tough response to a strike by Buenos Aires telephone workers, who were protesting the privatization of the state telephone company Entel (Ibid). Menem fired several hundred of them (Epstein 1992, p.152 Fuego in late 1990, state workers "shouted insults until he gave up trying to speak". 11 All in all, this looks less like the mass conversion of left-wing activists and voters or a loyal rallying behind their leader than a perilous struggle by Menem to survive as the policy underpinnings for stability were levered into place. Menem did not receive a honeymoon from those on the left. He was able to intimidate some militants by firing workers and to win back support from others after inflation came down.
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In Brazil, Cardoso was a centrist politician who had started out as a socialist intellectual. His early neo-Marxist publications did not shield him from fierce left-wing opposition when he attempted 1985-86 1986-90 1990-94 1994-98 1998- 1983-85 1985-87 1987-89 1989-91 1991-93 1993-95 1995-97 1997-99 1999-2001 to stabilize. Some of his own ministers threatened to resign, and the labor minister, who was from Cardoso's own PSDB, publicly criticized the Real Plan (Resende-Santos 1997, p.185) . The number of strikes increased in the early years of the Real Plan, and the number of strikers-although peaking in 1993, before the Real Plan-remained high until 1997. In May 1995, relations with labor deteriorated to the point where Cardoso used military troops against oil industry strikers (ibid, p.187). In 1996, public sector strikers trapped the Finance Minister, Pedro Malan, in his office (Kingstone 1999, p.217) .
Argentina
Was Menem or Cardoso successful because his party had captured the key federal veto points? If this was the key, it is hard to understand why the military regimes in both countries also failed to stabilize. Even under conditions of political repression, in which there was little danger of opposition from parliament or the state-houses, serious attempts at macroeconomic stabilization failed. The most notable Argentine attempt was under economy minister Martínez de Hoz in the late 1970s. Even if we focus on just the democratic period, the argument seems weak. Table 2 shows the distribution of party strength in each country's presidency, chamber of deputies, senate, and state governorships. In Brazil in 1994-8, Cardoso's party, the PSDB, controlled none of the key institutions besides the presidency. He relied upon a coalition with the PMDB, which had a plurality in the two houses and a majority of state governorships.
13 Others had governed with more powerful coalitionsfor instance, Sarney, whose Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL) in 1986-90 also joined with the PMDB, which then had an absolute majority in both houses. Yet Cardoso succeeded in stabilization, whereas Sarney failed repeatedly.
The argument might seem more plausible in Argentina. Alfonsín was certainly constrained by the hostile Peronist plurality in the Senate and among the governors. From 1990 From until 1995 From (and then in 1997 , Menem had a Justicialista plurality in the Chamber of Deputies and a majority in the 13 Given the weakness of party discipline in Brazil and the large number of parties in the parliament, coalitions have to be painstakingly constructed. See, for instance, Ames (2001) .
Senate and among provincial governors. From 1995-7, he even had an absolute majority in the Chamber.
However, the argument cannot by itself explain the Argentine case. Although it probably helps, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for the president's party to control all veto points for the president to stabilize successfully. It is not sufficient because even members of the president's party may vote against his proposals, albeit at some cost. This was the case for Menem. Key legislationfor instance, the convertibility law itself-were passed with help from right-wing parties in the Chamber of Deputies, with a number of Justicialista Party members voting against. As already noted, Menem faced serious challenges from within the Peronist camp-from labor unions whose members' jobs and wages were being cut, from governors worried by fiscal austerity, from leadership rivals who hoped to benefit from his failure. Menem's minister of the economy, Domingo Cavallo, faced the greatest opposition to tax increases from Peronists in the parliament (Acuna 1995, p.36). Resistance to Menem's reforms also came from some of the country's Peronist governors (Manzetti 1993, p.72) .
Regardless who controlled the key institutional veto points, other actors had ways to block implementation. The strength of Menem's support in parliament mattered little if financial speculators chose to bid against a weakened central bank. Early attempts to stabilize under both Alfonsín and Menem failed when major exporters staged a golpe de mercado, or "market coup", dumping australs on the market to drive down the exchange rate. Real coup attempts by the military-or major labor unrest-could undermine confidence in the currency and scare away investors, whatever laws the parliament passed.
Control by the president's party of all major veto points is not necessary for the passage of reforms since other parties may support a stabilization program-as, in fact, occurred in both Argentina and Brazil. Menem's first major laws-the Economic Emergency Law and the State Reform Law of 1989-were passed with the tacit cooperation of the major opposition party, the UCR, which agreed not to oppose Menem's economic initiatives for six months in return for his agreement to take office early. Later laws often required the votes of small regional parties and the liberal Unión del Centro Democrático. In Brazil, Cardoso's PSDB never had more than 20 percent of the seats in either house of parliament, and he was forced to rely on a coalition of five parties (Kingstone 1999, p.199) .
Although aspects of these arguments contribute to an explanation, Menem and Cardoso's victories over inflation remain quite puzzling. To understand how they succeeded, one needs to consider their strategies in more detail.
Stakeholders and Stabilization Tactics
The outcomes of most games are not completely determined by the nature of the rules or the goals of the players. They depend also on what strategies are chosen at key points. The task that faced Menem and Cardoso was to identify which actors had the power and the motive to impede macroeconomic stabilization and to find ways to neutralize some while coopting others.
Brazil
Brazil's institutional structure and economic history created four major groups of stakeholders with an interest in inflation or the deficit spending that fueled it and the ability to obstruct change. First, public sector employees (along with pensioners, and certain narrow interest groups) were guaranteed expensive entitlements by the 1988 constitution. 14 They were prepared to defend these by voting, demonstrating, striking, and lobbying via their unions. Second, politicians in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate wanted to continue receiving the perks of office. Some also hoped later to seek election in their states. They could block attempts to cut pork from the federal budget or to reform fiscal or banking laws. Third, the constitution greatly decentralized government revenues (Weyland 2000, p.42) . State governors wanted to retain these revenues and extract additional funds, often by means of the state banks, whose loans were later bailed out by the federal government. Given the weakness of party discipline, governors were needed to deliver the state congressional delegations.
They could also provoke crises by refusing to remit federal taxes or accept a restructuring of their state banks. 15 A fourth influential group-the business community-mostly suffered from inflation, but at the same time feared the high real interest rates needed to cure it. Big businesss could decline to buy federal government bonds and lobby against an opening to foreign capital.
All these groups were prepared to use their political leverage to block spending cuts or other This strategy involved tactics for coopting or neutralizing each of the main stakeholders. Repeatedly, Cardoso played their "short-term interests off against their long-term goals," offering "patronage now in order to persuade politicians to accept state-building reforms that [sought] to limit patronage in the future" (Weyland 2000, p.50 ).
Cardoso's approach to public employees was characteristic. He appeased them with shortterm spending and higher salaries, while privatizing many of the enterprises that provided their jobs.
In late 1994, public sector salaries were raised, resulting in a 22 percent increase in federal personnel spending in 1995 and major additional payroll costs for the state governments (IMF 2001b, p.155; Weyland 2000, p.54) . The next year, Cardoso set out to sell off state monopolies in electricity and gasoline. When the oil workers' union went on strike in May 1995, the government denounced the strikers as "enemies of the people" and sent the military to secure the petroleum refineries (Kingstone 1999, p.205) . Privatizations in petrochemicals, railroads, electricity, and telecommunications raised US $33.4 billion for the federal budget in 1994-8 (Pinheiro 2000, p.17) .
Appeasing parliament required helping the politicians to please their local constituencies and not complaining too much about their perquisites. 19 One of his first acts in office was to approve a 100-percent increase in legislative and executive salaries (Kingstone 1999, p.202 The strength of the PFL and PMDB in the country's poorer, more clientelistic, but legislatively overrepresented North, North-East, and Center-West regions helped push legislation through. 21 NorthEastern deputies and senators were "strategically positioned on the key congressional committees" dealing with fiscal and infrastructure issues (Selcher 1998, pp.32-6; Power 1998) . To woo rural deputies, Cardoso deferred some $1.8-5 billion in landowners' debt payments to the Banco do Brasil (Mainwaring 1999, p.317) Helping legislators satisfy their local interests dovetailed with measures to coopt the state governors, whose fiscal profligacy, channeled upward for bailouts via the state banks, was a major source of inflationary pressure. Cardoso's strategy was to offer governors large financial benefits in return for an end to their most inflationary practices-in essence, another trade of money (in this case credit) for institutional changes. The key challenge was to deal with the massively endebted state 20 For instance, José Sarney could draw separate state pensions as a former president, governor, senator, and deputy (Flesicher 1998, p.131) . 21 This alliance of Cardoso's social democratic party with the clientelistic, right-wing parties of political bosses from the poorer provinces is reminiscent of the "metropolitan" and "peripheral" subcoalitions in the Peronist movement under Menem and Perón himself, and a similar cross-linkage in the Mexican PRI. The "peripheral" coalition, in each case, enabled what was thought of as a "left-wing" party to engage in neoliberal reform without damaging its electoral prospects (Gibson 1997 and that of Minas Geraís was sold in September 1998 (Baer 2001, p.313 ).
Collor's final mistake had been to alienate the business community. 24 From the start, Cardoso was more careful, meeting regularly with business leaders, and sending his ministers to consult them (Kingstone 2000, p.200) . Two business sectors had reason to dislike the Real Plan's stabilization strategy. First, the high real interest rates needed for deficit financing attracted in foreign capital, 22 The constitutional decentralization of revenues appeared impossible then to reverse; Cardoso concentrated instead on devolving matching spending responsibilities. 23 In part, the states' debts were written off; in part, states were to repay the federal government at subsidized interest rates. For instance, under the agreement signed with São Paulo State in 1997, 7.5 percent of the debt was forgiven, 12.5 percent was to be amortized immediately by transfer of stock in state enterprises to the federal government, and 80 percent was refinanced as a 30-year loan at a low real interest rate of 6 percent (Dillinger and Webb 1998, p.30) . The state's debt service was capped at 13 percent of net current revenues. 24 It was also his first: he had never even consulted the most powerful business association, the FIESP, when drafting the 1990 stabilization plan (Weyland 2000, p.45) .
driving up the exchange rate. While this suited importers, it hurt exporters and domestic producers, who faced competition from cheap imports. Cardoso responded to protests from these groups with a variety of concessions. He increased import tariffs in the automobile, consumer electronics, and electrical appliances sectors. Tariffs on cars rose to 70 percent (Kingstone 2000, p.197) . The government also reduced export taxes, and provided credit lines to hard-hit sectors via the federal state development bank. Stabilization and liberalization initiated a process of mergers and foreign investment that left many firms closely linked to foreign capital, and therefore dependent on continued liberal policies (Kingstone 1999) . By late 1996, business opposition to the Real Plan had subsided.
The second business sector feeling the pinch was private banking. Commercial banks had profited richly from inflation by delaying clearances on accounts with low interest rates and investing the funds in high-yield overnight government bonds. Profits on this "inflationary float" were estimated at about four percent of GDP in 1990-3, or more than one third of banks' total revenues While drying up the banks' traditional money-maker, Cardoso's policies created another. To finance its deficit, the federal government issued an increasing volume of treasury securities at high real interest rates. The more agile banks switched from exploiting the inflationary float to borrowing abroad and buying domestic government bonds. As one observer noted, Brazilian banks could borrow at 12 percent abroad and earn about 30 percent on government bonds; even after paying taxes and hedging costs, the profits were enormous (Filho 1998, p.14-15 operational deficits rose. 27 While denouncing the over-generous constitutional social security provisions, it did not make the mistake of winning their repeal too soon. Stabilization relied on tight reserve requirements, high interest rates, import competition (except on protected goods), reform of state banks to restore investor confidence, privatization to raise cash and attract foreign capital, and a variety of fiscal and political payoffs to those threatened by aspects of this strategy. The relative political calm and high interest rates encouraged foreign investors to overlook the large budget deficits and keep supplying the funds on which the strategy depended. By contrast, the Collor administration had achieved a decisive fiscal adjustment and a budget surplus-scoring high marks for political will and neoliberalism-but had failed to create confidence that these changes would be politically sustainable.
26 Treisman (1998) makes a similar argument about the role of high-interest-rate government bonds in reconciling the Russian commercial banking sector to the end of high inflation in the mid-1990s. 27 As Kingstone (1999, p.196 ) correctly notes, there was a significant fiscal adjustment in 1993-4. But it proved short-lived. In 1995 the operational public sector borrowing requirement jumped from -1.1 to 5.0 percent of GDP (Pinheiro et al. 2000, p.19 ).
One should not exaggerate the coherence of Cardoso's strategy or the clairvoyance of its designer. In many ways it was improvised, and it could easily have collapsed. Credibility was won gradually, and at moments seemed to be eroding-as in late 1996, when many feared the real was seriously overvalued and S&P rated Brazil's banking system the riskiest in Latin America (Kingstone 1999, p.218) . The rapid accumulation of foreign debt alarmed many. Brazil's strategy-like that followed simultaneously by Russia's economic reformers-depended on the confidence of international financial markets. When that failed, so too did the currency, which was devalued in January 1999. However, as in Russia, devaluation did not prompt more than a temporary burst of inflation. The coalitions and institutional changes that underlay the Real Plan's political credibility proved more important in the end than any particular parity of the currency.
Argentina
Argentina's macroeconomic stakeholders resembled those in Brazil. First, urban workers-especially public employees-aimed to protect their jobs and wages, and had militant unions to coordinate strikes (Murillo 2000) . Second, two business subgroups could torpedo stabilization. A set of domestically-oriented businessmen, the capitanes de la industria , benefited from state subsidies, contracts, or protection. Budget cuts, tax increases, or external liberalization would threaten their profits. At the same time, the relatively small internationally-oriented sector, centered around agroexports and banking, would lose from real exchange rate appreciation. As in Brazil, domestic banks were profiting from the inflationary float. Both business sectors had representatives in parliament and among provincial governors. Internationally-oriented business had additional leverage: given large fiscal deficits and low central bank reserves, its dollars were vital to sustain the currency and government bond markets. Third, despite Argentina's more centralized party system, provincial governors had influence over their provinces' congressional delegations. They hoped to retain a high From late 1987, the government set out to build a coalition combining some of the domestically-oriented businessmen with some of the more conservative unionists. It began to negotiate informally with a number of the capitanes, though not with the main business 28 The military might be considered a fifth stakeholder. It wanted continued funding, and could threaten coups. 29 See Manzetti (1992) , Smith (1992) , Pion-Berlin and López (1992) . My point is not that these measures were undesirable, just that pursuing them simultaneously was bound to fail. 30 He did make some minor attempts at cooptation, appointing a secretary of agriculture from the main agricultural association and meeting with some more moderate unionists. But these steps were too insignificant to be effective. 31 Increasing tensions with the army further complicated things. Fearing they would be tried as well as the junta leaders, junior officers rebelled on three occasions. Alfonsín essentially gave in, raising military wages and passing a law that required the presumption of innocence for those who had committed crimes while following orders.
confederations. In the hope of dividing the Peronist labor movement, Alfonsín appointed one unionist, Carlos Alderete, minister of labor. Finally, in August 1988, the government invited the business confederations to participate in making policy, and negotiated a "price truce" with two of them. However, with a presidential election looming, these concessions proved insufficient and selfdefeating. Alderete refused to settle for just a ministerial armchair, insisting instead on inflationary wage increases. Very sharp spending cuts failed to balance the budget, since revenues dropped too.
The two groups crucial to sustaining the exchange rate -the domestic banking and agro-export sectors-were not part of Alfonsín's cooptation strategy, and felt little desire to help him. Fear of exhaustion of the bank's reserves and a Peronist victory in the presidential election led to a run on the currency in February 1989. Once aga in, the plan collapsed in a burst of hyperinflation. In May 1989, urban food riots erupted (Epstein 1992, p. 3).
The collapse of Alfonsín's stabilization attempts suggests two points. First, unless a credible political coalition could be lined up behind government policies, temporary budget cuts and drops in inflation would be viewed as just that-temporary. Inflationary expectations would stay high, and the distributive free-for-all would continue. A credible political coalition required the permanent weakening of some groups alongside the cooptation of others. Second, given the difficulty of reducing deficits, the agro-export sector had to be part of the coalition, at least initially. The concentration of exports, the low level of foreign investment, and the central bank's meager reserves meant that a few major exporters could determine the exchange rate and thus whether deficits could be financed.
From his inauguration in July 1989, Menem's economic strategy looked designed to avoid Alfonsín's mistakes. Like his predecessor, he sought to coopt the capitanes and to unite with mainstream labor leaders against the more militant unionists. But he also set out to neutralize the military, and-most importantly-he made the agro-export sector the centerpiece of his coalition. For legislative and electoral support, he relied on one of the two main sub-constituencies of Peronism-political bosses from poorer, interior provinces that were over-represented in congress; this made it possible to marginalize the second key constituency-the urban working class (Gibson 1997 ).
The currencies he used to reward his partners were carefully chosen to minimize the inflationary impact. First, Menem appeased the army with non-financial concessions-issuing a sweeping pardon of soldiers accused or convicted of human rights abuses-while, like Alfonsín, reducing the military budget. 32 Second, he split the union movement, appointing some leaders to high positions (including his labor minister, Jorge Triaca), and driving the more militant unions under Ubaldini into opposition. When workers in the telephone, steel, and oil industries went on strike,
Menem fired the ringleaders and threatened to call out the military (Corrales 1998, p.26) . To woo the agro-export sector, Menem appointed two successive economy ministers from the agro-business multinational Bunge & Born, 33 and gave them a relatively free hand in designing the "BB" stabilization plan of 1989. He increased import duties for agrochemicals (a key line of B&B's business), while decreasing tariffs for other industrial products (Peralta-Ramos 1992, p.110). In return, the major grain companies promised to lend the Central Bank $2.5 billion in emergency aid.
Despite all this, the plan collapsed in December under the pressure of yet another golpe de mercado. Hoping to force the government to lower export taxes, major agro-businesses withheld an estimated $2 billion dollars from the exchange market (Acuna 1995, p.30). As other speculators dumped the currency, bond rates soared. Late in the year, the government gave in, devaluing by 53 percent and unilaterally rescheduling its bonds. The general uproar from virtually all economic groups forced the economy minister to resign. Why the failure? Certain vital members of the coalition
had not yet been coopted. Those that had-most importantly, the agro-business sector-were given mostly symbolic rather than material benefits. However gratified the agro-export tycoons might feel to see a colleague in the economics ministry, that did not persuade them to withdraw demands for tax 32 Consolidated public sector spending on defense and security dropped from 2.4 percent of GDP in 1988 to 2.1 percent in 1993 (IMF 1998, p.30) . Menem also made several cabinet and military appointments that pleased the military dissidents. The day after his inauguration, the full cabinet attended a 5-hour-long military parade, and Menem often visited military units (Starr 1997, p.105) . 33 The first died after less than a week in office.
breaks. 34 Since a bargain with agro-exporters to support the currency would not, in any case, be enforceable, tactics were required to give holders of dollars a direct interest in currency stability. This was a key ingredient of the successful Menem strategy of 1990-2.
The centerpiece of this political strategy was privatization. In just a few months, gas and electric companies, the national water and sewage companies, petrochemical, iron and steel firms, the post office, ports, and two public tv channels were all put up for sale. Privatization had a direct fiscal purpose. It raised cash for financing the deficit-a total of more than $10 billion in 1990-4 35 -as well as retiring some $5 billion worth of debt papers, which made possible a Brady deal in 1992 and a return to international money markets. It also reduced the need to finance insolvent public firms; in 1989, the total losses of the 13 biggest came to almost $4 billion (Pastor and Wise 1999, p.487) . The political effect of privatization was to change the pattern of stakeholders in two ways.
First, privatization was used to coopt leading capitanes de la industria and agro-export tycoons (Corrales 1998) . Early in Menem's term, the capitanes bitterly opposed privatization, which threatened their access to overpriced public works contracts. 36 Within two years, Menem had managed to coopt their leaders by giving them preference in public sales, and sweetening the deals with debt cancelations, monopoly protections, or low prices (Peralta-Ramos 1992, p.110). The Wall Street Journal accused Menem of selling the state telephone company Entel and the airline Aerolíneas Argentinas "for a fraction of their net worth." 37 Such sugar-coating helped avoid the business opposition that had blocked Alfons ín's attempts to privatize the same companies (PeraltaRamos 1992, pp.118-9). Some of the leading agro-export conglomerates, such as Bunge & Born, also acquired stakes in privatized firms (Bambacci et al. 2001, p.35; Alexander and Corti 1993) . 34 In fact, they did not even make good on formal agreements: of the $2.5 billion loan promised by the grain companies, only $370 million was actually delivered (Peralta-Ramos 1992, p.153) . 35 This is calculated from Marina Ongaro, Mariano Cena, Juan Francisco Carluccio, and Jorge Rodríguez (2000, Annex 2). 36 According to Corrales (1998, p.34) , in 1989 private businesses overcharged the government by about $2.5 billion and received an additional $2.2 billion in tax breaks. 37 Wall Street Journal, August 31, 1990 , quoted in Peralta Ramos 1992 By getting the titans of Argentine business to buy state enterprises, Menem changed their interests. Such entrepreneurs now needed currency stability in order to sell their shares to foreign investors at a handsome profit. Since many of the privatized firms produced non-tradables (telephone calls, airline flights, gas transportation), depreciation would lower the relative price of their output, and the implicit dollar value of their assets. 38 An agro-exporter whose grain would be more competitive if the austral's value fell would, if persuaded to buy a large stake in a domestic gas distributor, suddenly have a lot to lose in a devaluation. Firms accused of speculating against the currency in past crises would have reason to fear future market coups. Along with an IMF announcement of additional aid, this helped turn the tide.
Privatization's second effect was to create a new stakeholder-foreign capital. Contest rules often required foreign involvement, and the foreign direct investment stock rose from $9 billion to $73 billion during the 1990s (UNCTAD 2001, p.302) . This inflow helped to finance the balance of payments (Llanos 2001, p.78) . But it also had political effects. Foreign investors, interested in the dollar value of their Argentine assets, had motive either to support the peso themselves, to hedge risk with other investors (giving them reason to support it), or to lobby their governments to provide 38 This was not true in the case of some electricity companies, whose privatization contracts pegged prices to the dollar. But the demand for electricity would have declined as the price rose in peso terms, squeezing profits. 39 In December 1989, one Peronist congressman accused the engineering conglomerate Techint of being among the leading speculators (Latin American Weekly Report, WR-89-48, 7 December, 1989, p.9) . The next year, Techint became deeply involved in privatization, acquiring stakes in a railway line, a national road concession, an oil pipeline, an electricity company, and a gas transportation company, as well as participating in the consortium that bought the southern zone of Entel. The same Peronist congressman also accused Banco General de Negocios of having helped undermine the austral in late 1989. Banco General de Negocios was among three banks the government chose in 1991 to manage the sale of the state electricity company SEGBA (Petrazzini 1993, pp.74-5) .
financial aid at critical moments. 40 For instance, Spanish companies played a major role in Argentine privatization, investing more than $30 billion in the country. By 2000, Spain's two largest banks, BBVA and SCH, controlled 20 percent of the Argentine banking system. Each invested heavily in Argentine government bonds, and stood to lose billions in a devaluation. 41 In November 2001, as crisis loomed and most investors were racing for the exits, SCH readied an additional $670 million to add to its Argentine investments. 42 Earlier that year, the Spanish government had pledged $170 million in aid to Argentina, and was reportedly considering extending up to $1 billion. 43 Later Long term fiscal adjustment required major reforms of the tax system, provincial state banks, and social security-changes that directly threatened the provincial governments. Menem could not even rely on his own party members for support. Justicialista members of the Senate budget committee watered down efforts to eliminate tax exemptions for four underdeveloped provinces, and tried to increase automatic transfers to the provinces (Eaton 2000, pp.427-8) . Despite such opposition, Menem managed to broaden the base of VAT, increasing federal tax revenues by three percent of GDP between 1989 and 1993. 46 State banks were gradually shut down or privatized. Many provinces also accepted a federal takeover of their troubled pension systems, and agreed in 1992 to let 15 percent of their coparticipation transfers be diverted to shore up social security.
How did Menem do it? To get fiscal legislation passed, Menem relied on a coalition of the over-represented poorer provinces plus Buenos Aires Province (Dillinger and Webb 1998) . 47 The poorer provinces stood to gain from larger federal collections, since a majority-17 of 24 provinces in 1996-received more in estimated federal transfers and federal spending than their residents paid in federal taxes (see Figure 6) . 48 Where necessary, Menem bought support retail with targeted concessions. The interior provinces objected to VAT on services as this would increase costs of longdistance shipping; Menem exempted freight transport (Eaton 2000 47 The poor provinces, with 20 percent of the popuation, had 58 percent of seats in the senate. These provinces, along with Buenos Aires Province, had a majority in the lower house (Bambaci et al. 2000) . 48 The data are estimates from World Bank (1998, pp.53, 57). 1996a, p.ii). Formosa received a free trade zone and public works projects. A debt impasse with
Chaco province was resolved (Schwartz and Liuksila 1997) . Reforms of industrial subsidies to interior provinces were "pushed onto the back burner" until late 1992 (Sawers and Massacane 2001, p.127 ).
[ Figure 6 here]
To wean provinces from central bank bailouts, Menem let them borrow privately using their future federal transfers as collateral. This provided credit, but made default costly. The government offered cash incentives-partly funded by the World Bank-to provinces that surrendered their state banks. By mid-1998, 20 of the 26 provincial state banks had been closed or privatized (Nicolini et al. 2000, p.8) . Once again, the government traded money for institutional changes that enhanced the system's credibility. In a similar trade, the government assumed responsibility for provincial pension systems (11 by 1996), at a cost that reached $1.5 billion in 1998 alone (Ibid, p.13).
To recap, privatization helped finance the budget deficit and attract foreign dollars to balance the current account. Giving major domestic businesses stakes in privatized companies weakened their resistance to stabilization. By including major foreign companies and banks, the government created a new stakeholder with access to dollars and an interest in stability, diluting the agro-export sector's influence over the currency market. Financial liberalization increasingly dollarized lending to businesses and middle class home-owners, rendering them vulnerable to devaluation. Targeted concessions helped secure a coalition behind tax reforms that reduced the deficit. And major cash payments won provinces' acquiescence to reforms of danger points in the country's financial architecture. Unions were part coopted, part neutralized, and the armed forces were appeased with criminal immunity. Together, these measures created unprecedented confidence in the currency, at least for a while.
Menem's tactics were so successful at forging consensus behind the fixed exchange rate that, in a perverse twist, they helped prepare the economic and political crisis of late 2001. 
Concluding remarks
Argentina and Brazil's struggles against inflation in the 1980s and 1990s are hard to understand without examining the tactics of reformers. Each country's failures and achievements cannot be traced straightforwardly to the extent of crisis, the electoral calendar, or the pattern of party control over political veto points (although the last was probably important). Nor do the details of these cases fit interpretations of stabilization as the climax of a "war of attrition" or the result of left-wing leaders' greater credibility with labor.
From a purely economic standpoint, the two cases seem strange. Although labeled "neoliberal", the strategies of both Cardoso and Menem contained much that was unorthodox. Most economists agree that stabilization requires a low public sector deficit, which usually means cutting spending. In Brazil, public sector deficits rose under the Real Plan, and in both countries spending increased sharply before and during stabilization. 50 Brazil's burgeoning deficits help explain why it 49 Exports were actually quite stable during the first years of the recession, and in any case constituted only a small share of GDP. Nevertheless, a more competitive exchange rate would certainly have helped. 50 In Argentina, public sector spending rose from 17. 51 Some observers write as though it were the laws themselves-e.g., the Argentine convertibility law, or the new central bank charter of 1992, which banned it from lending to domestic borrowers-that entrenched the commitment to low inflation. However, parliament can repeal laws as easily as it can pass them. In fact, the central bank's charter was amended in 1995 to permit it to provide "advances to financial institutions to deal with temprorary situations of liquidity," on terms left to the central bank's discretion-precisely what the 1992 version had sought to rule out. Even before this, the state-owned Banco de la Nación had been called upon to purchase some 982 million pesos worth of bad loans from illiquid banks (Calcagno 1997, p.80 In coopting allies, two methods can be distinguished. The first involves a direct bargain: the reformer promises to provide some benefit if the stakeholder withdraws his opposition. The problem with such quid pro quo's is that enforcement is often not credible. For instance, had Menem promised the Argentine export conglomerates some benefit if they declined to dump australs, this would have been unenforceable given the anonymity of (black market) currency trades. The second method is to provide the stakeholder with an opportunity or asset whose value increases with success of the proposed reform: to create vested interests. The advantage of this technique is that it is self-enforcing.
One example is the sale of enterprises producing nontradeables to the Argentine conglomerates, giving them a stake in currency stability. The difficulty is how to vest such interests: the demand deposits, including those in dollars) was not covered by the hard currency reserve requirement, which meant "convertibility" offered no defense against a run on the banks. And up to 20 percent of the peso's hard currency backing could consist of the Argentine government's own bonds (Calcagno 1997, p.66) . 52 Sarney failed in this, making too many compromises that were not strategically useful. Menem can also perhaps be criticized on this score. The extent of benefits he provided to allies during privatization may have exceeded those strictly needed to secure their participation. Expecting tax revenues to grow sharply after stabilization, he might have struck better deals with provincial governors over revenue distribution earlier on. And, though few anticipated the strength of the dollar in the 1990s, had Cavallo chosen to peg to some weaker basket of currencies the peso's real appreciation would have been slower. I am grateful to Daniel Artana and Ricardo Lopez-Murphy for suggesting these points.
conglomerates could sell the privatized companies to other investors, restoring their freedom of action.
The payoffs to coopt allies can be made in any of three cooptation currencies. First, the government might offer money as part of a quid pro quo. Cardoso's federal assumption of state debts in return for the privatization of state banks or utilities is an example. In this case, the bargain was overt and easily enforceable. Second, the government might coopt stakeholders by giving or selling them property-for example, Menem's sale of state enterprises to the capitanes. Since reselling these properties at a profit required macroeconomic stability, this created a vested interest at least in the short run. The third cooptation currency is state-created market restrictions that generate rents.
Cardoso's decision to slap 70 percent tariffs on imported cars is an example.
From the standpoint of efficiency, transferring property and cash are superior to introducing market distortions. Thus, to evaluate reform tactics one must consider whether reformers used the least distortionary cooptation currency. In the case of Brazilian car producers, a lump sum transfer might have worked as well (though it might have been harder to administer and justify). In the Argentine privatizations, lowering the price and discriminating in favor of bids from key stakeholders would have been less distortionary than guaranteeing monopoly power. Ironically, the more efficient options would probably have appeared more corrupt. They would also have cost the government more cash up front, at a time when such cash was vitally needed for the anti-inflation crusade.
Finally, it is important to recall that tactics are neutral. They can be used to pursue good or bad objectives, and objectives may change over time. In Argentina, Menem's skill became President
De la Rúa's misfortune. The former had entrenched support for dollar-peso parity so effectively that it would have required far more tactical skill than De la Rúa could muster to build a coalition for changing it. Menem's tactics created vested interests not just in low inflation but in a particular value of the exchange rate. Delinking the two remained extremely hard even after most economists came to think a measured devaluation would help restore growth. Menem's less politically adept successor was swept away before he found a solution. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 M2 growth (%)
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Presidential election
Legislative election Stabilization attempt 1 2 3 4 5
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Presidential election
Legislative election Stabilization attempt 6 7 8 9 10 11
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